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ADVERTISING AND THE CHARTER: JUST DO IT?
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RECOGNITION OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION
ANDREW WILSON

I. INTRODUCTION

There is perhaps no area of Canadian law as hotly contested as the
definition of rights under the Canadian Charter qf Rights and
Freedoms. 1 One area of Charter jurisprudence which has developed a
particularly high level of controversy is the recognition of "commercial
expression" as falling under the purview of "freedom of expression" and
thereby deserving of s. 2(b) Charter protection. 2 The source of this
controversy relates to the nature of both the Charter's guarantees and of
commercial expression. The Charter is the supreme law of Canada and
the main source of our constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms.
Commercial expression is that expression having the sale of a good or
service as its purpose. According to R. Sharpe,
A commercial message is one which has as its purpose the proposal of
an economic transaction. A commercial message is one which
promotes or attempts to entice a specific decision on the part of the
recipient of the message to agree to an economic exchange of money
in return for goods or services. 3

Commercial expression is, simply put, advertising. Many people no
doubt feel a certain level of discomfort affording advertising for
breakfast cereal the same level of constitutional protection as political
speech. 4 Despite this common sensical antipathy toward commercial
1
Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the Collstitutioll Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
Section 2(b) of the Charter reads:
"2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: ... (b) freedom of
thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press
and other media of communication".
3
R.J. Sharpe, "Commercial Expression and the Charter" (1987), 37 U. ofT.L.J. 229 at 230.
4
J.D. McAlpine and C.A. Donovan, "Case Comments: Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General),
Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General)" (1989), 23 U.B.C. L.R. 615 at 615.
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expression, the Supreme Court has firmly entrenched commercial
expression as being within the purview of section 2(b) of the Charter. 5
This paper will demonstrate why commercial expression should
not be afforded section 2(b) protection under the Charter. The Supreme
Court, in granting commercial expression constitutional recognition,
relied on a series of justifications. Upon closer analysis, these
justifications in fact lead to the conclusion that commercial expression
should be denied section 2(b) protection. The reasons given by the

5 See Ford v. Q!lebec (A.G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [hereinafter Ford]. In finding that
commercial expression did have pni11a .fade protection under s. 2(b) of the Charter, the
Supreme Court began by stating that the freedoms guaranteed the Charter "should be given a
large and liberal interpretation" and that there is "no sound basis on which commercial
expression can be excluded from the protection of s. 2(b) of the Charier." The Court gave
more specific reasons for according commercial speech constitutional protection (at p. 767):
Over and above its intrinsic value as expression, commercial expression,
which, as has been pointed out, protects listeners as well as speakers plays
a significant role in enabling individuals to make informed economic
choices, an important aspect of individual self-fulfilment and personal
autonomy. The Court accordingly rejects the view that commercial
expression serves no individual or societal value in a free and democratic
society and for this reason is undeserving of any constitutional protection.
See also /rwi11 Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A. G), [1989] I S.C.R. 927 [hereinafter /rwi11 Toy]. The
majority decision in lnJ!!i1 Toy (Dickson C.J., Lamer and Wilson J.J.) begins with an analysis
of what constitutes expression under s. 2(b). The Court gave expression a very broad scope
and decided that "if the activity conveys or attempts to convey meaning, it has expressive
content and prima.facie falls within the scope of the guarantee." The only limit the Court put
in place is that violence, as a for of expression, is not protected bys. 2(b). After deciding that
expression is to be defined broadly, the majority restated and summarized the reasons for
protecting freedom of expression as set out in Ford (at p.976):
We have already discussed the nature of the principles and values
underlying the vigilant protection of free expression in a society such as
ours. They were also discussed by the Court in Ford (at pp. 765-67), and
can be summarized as follows: (1) seeking and attaining the truth is an
inherently good activity; (2) participation in social and political decisionmaking is to be fostered and encouraged; and (3) the diversity in forms of
individual self-fulfilment and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in
an essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment not only for the
sake of those who convey a meaning, but also for the sake of those to
whom it is conveyed.
The dissenting minority in lnwi1 Toy (Beetz and Mcintyre J.J.) do not disagree with
the majority on the value(s) of free expression. The dissent, like the majority, supports the
reasons given in Ford at pp. 766-67, and go on to state that (at p. 1007) "[f]reedom of
expression under s. 2(b) is guaranteed as a fundamental freedom. Its importance and its value
are surely beyond question."
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Supreme Court support the constitutional recognition of commercial
expression in theory only, and not in practice.
The jurispmdential framework of the Supreme Court in deciding
these issues is a predominantly liberal one. In addition, the court uses
economic justifications for granting commercial expression
constitutional recognition. For these reasons this paper will use liberal
and law and economic analyses to challenge the conclusions reached by
the Supreme Court. Rather than demonstrate that the Court's
conclusions can be challenged by alternative legal philosophies (for
example, Critical Legal Studies or feminism), this paper proposes to
show that the Supreme Court's conclusions can be challenged from
within the very same framework( s) used by the Court.

The Supreme Court has granted constitutional protection to
commercial expression. The question to be answered is whether the
reasons given by the Court support the conclusion that commercial
expression deserves Charter protection. Each reason presented by the
Court will be analyzed in turn.

Intrinsic Value as Expression
The intrinsic value of free expression as expounded by the Supreme
Court rests on a firm liberal foundation. 6 While the works of Critical
Legal scholars such as Allan Hutchinson and Joel Bakan, and feminists
such as Naomi Wolf 7 provide powerful insights and critiques of the
assumptions that underlie the value of free expression, it is possible to
argue that commercial expression does not deserve constitutional
protection while remaining within a liberal framework. The arguments
which follow will thus draw on some of the works of Critical Legal
scholars and feminists, but will argue against the constitutional
A. Hutchinson, Wailing/or Com/ A Critique oflaw one/ Rights, (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1995) at 190. See also A. Hutchinson, "Money Talk: Against
Constitutionalizing (Commercial) Speech" (1990) 17 Can. Bus. L.J. 2 at 3.
7
A. Hutchison, Waitti1g/or Com/; ibid.: J. Bakan, Just Words: Co11stilurio11a! Rights cmcl
Social ff'ro11gs, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); N. Wolf, The Beau(v Alyt/1,
(Toronto: Random House, 1990).
6
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recogmt10n of commercial speech due to its "intrinsic value as
expression" from within a liberal framework, and not argue against the
framework itself.
Z: .The intrinsic Value

efExpression

The first step in the analysis must be to detennine what underlies
the intrinsic value of expression. Once this has been determined, it is
possible to analyze commercial expression to see if in fact it furthers the
values that underlie the constitutional protection of free expression. It is
the contention here that commercial expression does not advance these
values, but, rather, detracts from them, and therefore it was incorrect for
the Supreme Court to grant constitutional protection to commercial
express10n.
The Supreme Court has never categorically delineated the intrinsic
value of free expression. This is not surprising given the philosophical
enormity of the task. The Supreme Court has, however, set out a general
framework of these values. The best single exposition on the value of
free expression is that found in nwtn Toy.
(1) seeking and attaining the truth is an inherently good activity;

(2) participation in social and political decision making is to be
fostered and encouraged; and
(3) the diversity in forms of individual self-fulfilment and human
flourishing ought to be cultivated in an essentially tolerant, indeed
welcoming, environment ... 8

Other decisions of the Supreme Court also elaborate on the
intrinsic value of free expression. Edmonton Journal notes the
importance of free speech to democratic society9, and in Keegstra the
8
9

fnJ!lil Toy, supra note 5 at 976.

Edmo!l/Oll Jouma! v. Alberta (A.G.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 [hereinafter Edmol!/Oll
Jom7la/]. Edmo!l!Oll Jouma! does not deal directly with commercial expression, but does
contain important passages by Cory J. (agreed to by all the judgements of the court) on the
value of free expression (at p. 1336):
It is difficult to imagine a guaranteed right more impo11ant to a democratic
society than freedom of expression. Indeed a democracy cannot exist
without that freedom to express new ideas and to put forward opinions
about the functioning of public institutions. The concept of free and
uninhibited speech permeates all truly democratic societies and
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court notes the importance of free expression to the search for the truth
(scientific, artistic, political) and the common good, personal fulfilment
and the democratic commitment. 10
There is thus a general framework of what is understood by the
Supreme Court when it refers to the intrinsic value of free expression. It
is now possible to analyze commercial expression in order to see if it
does in fact advance these values, and thus to see if commercial
expression is in fact "intrinsically valuable as expression".
As was mentioned earlier, the conception of free expression by the
Supreme Court is based on a liberal legal philosophy. Liberal theory
institutions. The vital importance of the concept cannot be overemphasized.
Cory J. also states (at p. 1337) that the "principle of freedom of speech and expression has
been firmly accepted as a necessary feature of modern democracy."
10
R. v. Keegrstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [hereinafter Keegstra]. The following are selections
from the majority decision of Dickson J. on the values which underlie the guarantee of
freedom of expression (at p. 762-764):
At the core of freedom of expression lies the need to ensure that truth and
the common good are attained, whether in scientific and artistic endeavors
or in the process of determining the best course to take in our political
affairs. Since truth and the ideal form of political and social organization
can rarely, if at all, be identified with absolute certainty, it is difficult to
prohibit expression without impeding the free exchange of potentially
valuable information ... Indeed, expression can be used to the detriment of
our search for truth; the state should not be the sole arbiter of truth, but
neither should we overplay the view that rationality will overcome all
falsehoods in the unregulated marketplace of ideas.
Another component central to the rationale underlying s. 2(b) concerns the
vital role of free expression as a means of ensuring individuals the ability
to gain self-fulfilment by developing and articulating thoughts and ideas
as they see fit.
The connection between freedom of expression and the political process is
perhaps the linchpin of the s. 2(b) guarantee, and the nature of this
connection is largely derived from the Canadian commitment to
democracy. Freedom of expression is a crucial aspect of the democratic
commitment, not merely because it permits the best policies to be chosen
from among a wide array of proffered options, but additionally because it
helps to ensure that participation in the political process is open to all
persons. Such open participation must involve to a substantial degree the
notion that all persons are equally deserving of respect and dignity. The
state therefore cannot act to hi11der or condemn a political view without to
some extent harming the o'penness of Canadian democracy and its
associated tenet of equality for all.
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believes that individuals have the right to pursue their own version of
self-fulfilment without interference from others, especially the state. 11 It
is for this reason that free expression is so crucial: without the ability to
freely exchange ideas individuals would be unjustifiably hindered in the
pursuit of their own particular version of self-fulfilment. 12
For the sake of this paper the liberal theory of the person and of
expression will be assumed to be correct. In so doing, it is contended that
commercial expression does not deserve constitutional protection,
because it is not a form of expression that can be said to advance the
individual pursuit of self-fulfilment free from interference. Far from
advancing the individualist pursuit of one's own best ends, commercial
advertising acts to hinder this process. As the analysis which follows
will demonstrate, commercial expression acts to displace rational
decision making and informed choice and replace it with irrationality
and generally uninformed choice. If war is diplomacy by other means,
then commercial expression is censorship by other means, and under a
liberal framework is not deserving of constitutional protection.
The liberal argument in favour of constitutional protection of
commercial speech is based, in part, on a fundamental misunderstanding
of the nature of commercial expression. That misunderstanding is that
commercial expression is expression, properly understood. A closer
examination of advertising reveals that it is not expression as the
Supreme Court understands expression (in the Charter context),
because advertising, for the most part, does not serve any of the
fundamental values expression is thought to advance. 13 Most
commercial expression does not seek to advance the pursuit of selffulfilment; rather it seeks to manipulate, play on emotions, maximize
appeal and minimize information. It does not seek to advance selffulfilment, quite the opposite: it is designed to make people believe that
they have serious problems and only product x offers a solution. 14
Neil Postman points out that in order to be rationally considered,
any claim must take the form of a proposition. If the use of propositions
11 D. Dyzenhaus, "Liberalism, Pornography and the Rule of Law" in R. Devlin, ed.,
Canadicm PerspecliFes 011 Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) 13 at 13.
12 R. Moon, "Lifestyle Advertising and Classical Freedom of Expression Doctrine"
(1991) 36 McGill L.J. 77 at 122.
13 See Bakan, ./!ts! lf/ords, supra note 7 at 109.
14
ibid. at p. 109. See also p. 188 n. 30.
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is discarded, then the application of reason is not possible. 15 This
assertion undermines the idea that advertisements are a form of
expression deserving of constitutional protection, because, as Postman
points out:
Today, on television commercials, propositions are as scarce as
unattractive people. The truth or falsity of an advertiser's claim is
simply not an issue. A McDonald's commercial, for example, is not a
series of testable, logically ordered assertions. It is a drama - a
mythology, if you will
of handsome people selling, buying and
eating hamburgers, and being driven to near ecstasy by their good
fortune. No claims are made, except those the viewer projects onto or
infers from the drama. One can like or dislike a television commercial,
of course. But one cannot refute it. 16

While Postman talks exclusively of television commercials, this
rationale can be extended to print ads, as a single picture of beautiful
people being driven to rapture by a hamburger is as equally iiTefutable as
a television clip presenting the same image.
Advertisements are, for the most part, designed to be anti-rational.
That is they seek to persuade by playing on emotions and by
manipulation rather than through logic or information. 17 Through the use
of visual imagery the adve1iiser "tries to get the viewer to act for reasons
of which she/he is not fully conscious". 18 Naomi Wolf points out that
advertising aimed at women works to lower their self-esteem based on
images that are not open to consciousness-raising. 19 According to one
industry executive, "adve1iising is the art of arresting the human
intelligence just long enough to get money from it". 20
What this all means is that advertising is not a rational form of
expression which can be considered, analyzed and thus either rejected or
accepted. It is not meant to be. It therefore only enhances the values of
free speech indirectly or inadve1iently, if at all. Any contribution by
advertising to an individual's search for self-fulfilment must, for the
most part, be either accidental or, at best, completely secondary to its

15
16

17
18
19
20

N. Postman, A11111s1i1g Ourselves to Death (New York: Viking Penguin, 1985) at 127.
Ibid at 128.
Bakan, Stijlll7 note 7 at 109, (see also p. 187 n. 28, p. 189 n. 30).
Moon, Stijlm note 12 at 123.
Wolf, Stijlm note 7 at 84, 276-77.
Bakan, Stijlra note 7 at 109.
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primary objective. This position is best summed up by Richard Moon in
discussing lifestyle advertising:
Lifestyle advertising does not deserve constitutional protection
because it does not advance the values which are thought to underlie
the freedom. A lifestyle advertisement does not seek to articulate
inchoate feelings and ideas, to bring these to consciousness and to put
them in a public space for reflection or contemplation. It does not
contribute to the growth of individual and collective knowledge, the
understanding of oneself and of others, the emergence of reflective
agency and the development of positive "autonomy" understood as the
capacity to give conscious direction to one's life. 21

It is clearly the case that some exceptions to the above propositions
exist, and there is surely some advertising that does contain rational
propositions to be presented for the consumer's consideration.
According to research done by Sut Jhally, advertisements of this type do
exist, however they constitute a small minority. A survey of 1000
television advertisements revealed that fewer than ten percent of the
advertisements used a presentational form of either rational appeal or
economy/price appeal.2 2
It must be noted that this is not an argument that the content of the
messages should be denied protection; under a liberal approach the
government may not restrict content unless it can prove that it will harm
others. 23 The point is that for a majority of commercial expression there
is no content. When accepting picketing as a form of expression worthy
of s. 2(b) protection in Dolphhz De!ive1y the Supreme Court made it
clear that it was the fact that picketing conveys information (that there is
a dispute, that the union is seeking to impose its will on the object of the
strike, that the union wants the public's help) that made it a protected
form of expression. 24 A majority of advertising does not sufficiently

Moon, supra note 12 at 123.
S. Jhally, The Codes o/'AdJ1e11isti1g (New York: Routledge, 1990) at 154.
23
Dyzenhaus, s11pra note 11 at 13.
2
" RWDSUv. Dolp/ni1 De/iJ1e1y, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 [hereinafter Dolphi!l]. In ruling that
picketing constituted expression, Jusitce Mcintyre, for the majority, ruled that picketing had
an element of expression and was thus deserving of s. 2(b) protection (at p. 588): "There is, as
I have earlier said, always some element of expression in picketing. The union is making a
statement to the general public that it is involved in a dispute, that it is seeking to impose its
will on the object of the picketing, and that it solicits the assistance of the public in honouring
the picket line."
21

22
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convey any form of rational information or dialogue which would
qualify it as expression as understood in the constitutional context.
Given that less than ten percent of advertising seeks to persuade through
the use of rational or price appeal, it must be that a majority of
advertising does not serve rational, informed choice. Commercial
expression is designed to induce consumers to buy products, by
whatever means possible. Commercial expression is not designed to
improve individual autonomy or self-fulfilment. It seeks to displace
these in the hopes of a sale. For these reasons it is censorship by other
means.

ii Free Expression and Democracy
Another value of free expression that is not furthered by
commercial expression is the contribution of free speech to the
democratic political system. It can be argued that even if commercial
expression does not assist personal fulfilment, commercial expression
may merit Charter protection in that it helps to preserve or advance our
democratic system. However, upon closer inspection this argument is
similar to the self-fulfilment rationale, in that constitutional recognition
of commercial expression is more likely to hinder than help our
democratic system.
One reason that commercial expression does not serve to maintain
or advance our democratic system is that it threatens infonned choice,
which is a crucial element of a democratic system. As Hutchinson states:
... commercial speech is thoroughly undeserving of constitutional
protection and should be democratically regulated. By according it a
privileged status in the public discourse of democratic society, courts
jeopardize the likelihood of informed choice and the enhancement of
individual identity and the dilution of language as a form of social
action. It must be recognized that the quality of public discourse
intimately shapes individual choice, as well as the shared meanings
which protect people from that manipulation of language or expose
them to its worst abuses. 25 [emphasis in original]

By referring to the quality of public discourse Hutchinson argues
that if commercial expression comes to dominate public discourse, the

25

Hutchinson, "Money Talk" supra note 6 at 14.
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economic mindset that underlies commercial expression will also come
to dominate the discourse. 26
Another argument is that made by Postman, who argues that
television advertisements lead to a false set of beliefs, which has a major
impact on the level of political discourse:
... commercials have the advantage of vivid visual symbols through
which we may easily learn the lessons being taught ... Such beliefs
would naturally have implications for our orientation to political
discourse; that is to say we begin to accept as normal certain
assumptions about the political domain that either derive from or are
amplified by the television commercial. 27

Commercial speech is, as has been demonstrated, primarily lacking
in rational assertions. It is, therefore, outside the domain of expression
as understood by the Charter. As this f01m of "expression" becomes
more and more pervasive, rational discourse could be diminished.
Democratic politics suffer accordingly:
Under the aegis of advertising, electoral politics is eviscerated and
reduced to a hollow spectacle; form triumphs over substance by
conve1iing it into its own empty reflection. As the package has become
more significant than the product, so politician's images are more
important that their ideas ... Rhetoric replaces vision and slogans act as
a smTogate for debate; there is no real discussion as to the substantive
merits of any proposed programme. 28

Free expression is an essential requirement of democracy. In this
context however, commercial expression is not a form of free expression
it is its nemesis. The form which a majority of commercial expressions
adopt acts to reduce the reasoned debate thought to flow from free
speech. Commercial speech therefore cannot serve to enhance
democracy.
If commercial expression does not serve democracy directly, it has
been argued that it does so indirectly. Stefan Braun argues that some
level of commercial activity, and therefore commercial speech, is
necessary to political democracy. 29 Thus, commercial expression
ibid. at 15.
Supra note 15 at 131.
n Hutchinson, "Money Talk" supra note 5 at 15.
29
S. Braun, "Should Commercial Speech be Accorded Prima Facie Constitutional
Recognition Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?" ( 1986) 18 Ottawa L. Rev.
37 at 43.
26
27
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deserves constitutional protection because it does play a (indirect) role
in maintaining or advancing our democratic system.
This argument was considered and rejected by the Ontario
Divisional Court in .Re Klein. 3° Callaghan J. for the majority stated that
... the "free market" is itself only an idea, one particular idea, about
how goods should be distributed in society. It being only an idea about
how goods should be allocated among citizens, there is nothing to
prevent society from deciding that some other method of allocation is
better. 31

Braun argues that ultimately a nexus exists between the economic
and the political there is a connection between economic freedom and
political freedom. 32 There is no support for this claim. John Ralston Saul
argues that democracy does not equal capitalism, and that "[n]either
history nor philosophy link free markets and free men." 33 Even Braun
recognized that free commercial expression can exist in non-democratic
systems, but then asse1is that the opposite cannot be tme. 34 Braun's
proposition may be observationally correct (though even this is
questionable) but logically it simply does not hold that in order to
function democracy requires free markets. 35

2. Freedom of commercial expression protects listeners and allows
individuals to make informed economic decisions
In granting constitutional protection to commercial expression, the
Supreme Court advanced several arguments in order to justify its
decision. One is that commercial expression protects its listeners as well
as its speakers. Another is that commercial expression plays a
30

Re Kleti1 and Law Society [if Upper Canada (1985), 50 0.R. (2d) 118 (Div. Ct.)
[hereinafter Re Kleti1].
31
Ibid at 164. It should be noted that while the Supreme Court rejected Re K/eti1 in
deciding Ford, it did not expressly reject the notion that economic freedom and political
freedom are not inter-connected.
32
Supra note 29 at 43-44.
33
J.R. Saul, Vo/!ati·e s Bastards (Toronto: Penguin 1992) at 359.
34
Supra note 29 at 43-44.
35
See also the dissent in Virgtiua Stale Board [ifPharmacy v. Vti'gli11a Citizens Consumer
Council Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) by Renquist J. at 784: "there is certainly nothing in the
United States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew the teachings of
Adam Smith in its legislative decisions regulating the phannacy profession." (quoted with
approval by Callaghan J. in Re K/eti1 at 164).
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significant role in enabling individuals to make informed economic
decisions, which in tum is an important aspect of individual fulfilment
and personal autonomy. 36 These justifications are clearly economic in
nature. It is, therefore, appropriate to utilize a law and economics
analysis to determine the merit of these claims. Using a law and
economics framework 37 , the justifications of the Supreme Court will be
analyzed in terms of their economic effects. It is contended that a legal
economic analysis of these justifications will reveal that the Supreme
Court reached the wrong conclusion, and that the listeners are not
protected by commercial expression, nor are informed economic
decisions advanced by granting commercial expression constitutional
protection.
At the outset it should be noted that the issue of whether or not
commercial expression protects its speakers will not be considered.
There is little doubt that providing constitutional protection to
commercial speech will benefit those who wish to express themselves
commercially. However, and perhaps more importantly, the Supreme
Court did not give much weight to the fact that commercial expression
protects its speakers; it is the value of the information conveyed to the
listeners that the court considers important. 38 Because of the little weight
it was given by the Supreme Court, the protection of the speaker will,
therefore, not be considered in this analysis as a rationale relied on by
the Court for granting commercial speech constitutional protection.
The arguments that economic expression protects the listener and
enhances individual ability to make informed economic decisions are
closely connected. The concept of commercial speech protecting the
listener was established in Virginia Pharmacy, and was quoted
approvingly in Ford. 39 The supposed protection which commercial
expression provides is that it protects consumers against making
uninfonned purchasing decisions.
Ford, supra note 5 at 767.
See M. Trebilcock, "Economic Analysis of Law" in R. Devlin, ed., Ca11adia!l
PerspectiJJes 011 Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) 103. A law and
economics analysis attempts to analyse the economic implications of decisions or changes in
the legal system. The analysis can be either positive (descriptive/predictive analysis) or
normative (prescriptive or judgmental analysis).
38
K. Dubick, "Commercial Expression: A Second-Class" Freedom?", (1996) 60 Sask. L.R.
91 at 130. See also the reasons for protecting commercial speech given in Ford, supra note 5
at 767.
39
//ti;gi11ia Pharmacy, supra note 35 at 763-65; Ford, supra note 5 at 756.
36

37
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i Commercial Expression as a Source ofltifbrmation
The economic justification for advertising as a source of valued
information was first laid out by George Stigler. 40 Stigler argued that
advertising has value because it conveys information about sellers for
which buyers would be willing to pay. Advertising informs buyers who
the sellers are in a market. This reduces search costs on the paii of the
buyer, who need not go out "looking" for the seller. More importantly,
price advertising creates economic benefits in a number of ways. The
first is that, as before, search costs on the part of the buyer are reduced.
Secondly, if the goods are homogenous, advertising will reduce price
dispersions, because sellers will be forced to "match prices" with their
competitors or lose their (infonned) buyers. Finally, advertising has
value because prices change over time. Therefore, consumers would
have to continually re-search in order to have con-ect (i.e. current)
information. Advertising thus does not save a consumer from having to
perform one search. It saves the consumer from having to perform many
searches.
Stigler' s argument is deliberately simplistic and based on wholly
unrealistic assumptions. 41 However, the general theory he laid out has
been accepted as one of the key economic justifications for advertising,
and it was a general version of this theory that was accepted by
Blackmun J. in Vtiginia Pharmacy and consequently adopted (though
not expressly) in Ford 42
For the sake of a complete analysis it must also be recognized that
advertising is associated with certain costs. The most obvious is that
advertising is a cost in and of itself. Furthermore, John Kenneth
Galbraith has argued that advertising causes people to purchase things
they do not need, and is responsible for wasting economic resources
which could be used for more important social objectives. 43 W.
Comanor and T. Wilson argue that heavy advertising can be a major
40

G. Stigler, "The Economics oflnformation" (1961) 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213.
Stigler's analysis relies on the following assumptions: products are identical, buyers
have identical demand levels for all products, sellers are all identical and in equally convenient
locations.
42
Yirgi11ia Pha1111acy, supra note 35 at 763-65; Ford, supra note 5 at 756.
43
J. K. Galbraith, as quoted in B. Singer, "Advertising: A Sociocultural Force" in B.
Singer, ed. Comm1111icatio11s tit Canadian Society, 41h ed. (Scarborough: Nelson, 1995) 122 at
124; see also J.K. Galbraith, The Good Socie<'.'.F(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1996) at 82-83.
41
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barrier to entry in a market, thus allowing firms in the market to charge
higher prices than would otherwise be the case. 44
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to compare the
relative economic costs and benefits of advertising. This analysis
focuses on the benefits of advertising on which the courts have relied as
justification for constitutional recognition of commercial expression.
However, we must always be aware that these benefits do not exist in a
vacuum; while the analysis will not weigh benefits against costs in any
express sense, these costs must be keep in mind for the sake of a more
thorough analysis.
The theoretical economic justification for advertising sterns from
the fact that advertising conveys useful information, information of
economic value to the consumer. The informational value of
commercial expression has clearly been accepted by the Supreme Court:
in Ford the comi made reference to commercial expression "enabling
individuals to make informed economic choices"45 and in Rocket v.
Royal College q/Dental Surgeons McLachlin J. noted that commercial
expression enhances the ability to make "informed choices". 46
The problem with the rationale behind this theory, and thus the
Supreme Court's rationale, is that advertising does not in an
overwhelming majority of cases actually assist consumers in making
informed economic decisions. In order to promote informed economic
decisions, the information must have an economic component. Stigler
44

W. Coman or and T. Wilson, Adw11isi11g al!d 1Warlcet Power (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1974). This position in respect of television advertising is suppo1ied by
Albion and Farris in M. Albion and P. Farris, The Advertisillg Colltrover.sy (Boston: Auburn
House, 1981) at 180.
45
Supra note 5 at 767.
46
[ 1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 [hereinafter Ji'oclcet]. In ruling that s. 2(b) applies to commercial
speech, McLachlin J. for the Court stated that (at p. 241):
The argument against applying s. 2(b) to commercial speech rests on the
proposition that the Charter was not intended to protect economic
interests. This argument has been rejected by this Court on the grounds
that advertising involves more than economics. In Ford. .. where the issue
was the constitutionality of a provincial law restricting the language of
advertising, the Court noted advertising's intrinsic value as expression, the
protection afforded to the recipients of advertising as well as the
advertisers, and the importance of fostering informed economic choices to
individual fulfilment and autonomy. Hence in Ford and subsequently in
Irwin Toy. .. commercial advertising was held to be protected bys. 2(b) of
the Charter
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argued that advertising has value because gathering information is
costly, and that advertising, in that it provides consumers with
information which would otherwise necessitate search costs, makes
consumers better off. Unfortunately, empirical evidence demonstrates
that advertising does not generally convey information of economic
value.
Jhally, in an empirical study of 1000 American network television
advertisements, concluded that only 31. 7 per cent of advertisements
contained any objective product information, and only 6.2 per cent
contained any detailed objective information. 47 In his commentary on
the analysis, Jhally notes:
A defender of adve1iising might claim from these figures that almost
one-third of the sample gives objective product information. However,
this category was marked as present if any objective information was
given at all (for example, the mention of a car being four-wheel drive,
or a toothpaste containing fluoride). Any more precise information
was recorded in the 'objective-detailed' category (6.2 per cent). If
infonnation about products is transmitted, it is not the detailed variety.
What are communicated are a great deal (71.7 per cent) of subjective
claims (great, best, reliable, and so on) based largely on claimed but
undemonstrated superiority over rival, unnamed brands. 48 [emphasis
in original]

A 1977 American study of 378 television commercials revealed
that just under half were considered informative. Informative was
defined as communicating at least one of 14 broad criteria. 49 A similar
Canadian study in 1977 produced similar results. 50 It should be noted
that, while two of these three studies were conducted on commercials
airing on American TV, the results are at least in part informative for
Canadians as English-speaking Canadians spend an estimated 50% of
their television viewing time watching American channels. 51
An additional problem is that these figures only represent
television advertising, which is merely one form of commercial
47

Supra note 22 at 160.
Supra note 22 at 160-6 l.
49
Albion and Farris, supra note 44 at 40. Examples of the 14 criteria include "price or
value", "quality" and "packaging".
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Albion and Farris, supra note 44 at 40.
51
Media Awareness Network, "Media Usage: Television" (Source: CROP poll,
commissioned by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission,
September 24, 1998), online: http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/issues/stats/usetv.htm
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expression. However, television advertising, while only one form of
commercial expression, is also the most dominant. 52 The analysis is
therefore admittedly skewed towards television advertisements, but this
is not a fatal flaw in the analysis of commercial expression in general.
It thus seems that the rationale of the Supreme Court is not
supported by the evidence. Commercial expression for the most paii
does not assist individuals in making informed economic choices. In
fact, the situation is far more ironic: the constitutional recognition of
commercial expression diminishes consumer/listener protection and
impedes the ability of consumers to make informed economic
judgements.
ii Commercial Expressio11 a11d Asymmetric .111fannatio11

In his economic analysis of contract law, Trebilcock discusses the
problem of asymmetric info1mation as an impo1iant challenge to Pareto
optimal exchanges. 53 Trebilcock points out that cases of deliberate nondisclosure, while difficult to classify, create problems for contract law in
that non-disclosure will lead to exchanges that are not Pareto optimal. 54
The problems of asymmetric info1mation also apply to advertising.
Perhaps the best theoretical example of the problems of
asymmetric information is what is known in economic parlance as the
"market for lemons problem". 55 The market for lemons problem is
illustrated by an analysis of the market for used cars. It is assumed that
all used cars are either good or defective (lemons). The buyers of used
cars are unable to determine if a used car is good or defective until after
they have purchased the car. If the market is composed of good cars and
lemons in relatively equal amounts, the equilibrium price will fall
somewhere in the middle of the price of these two groups. The good cars
will be therefore be under-priced and lemons will be over-priced. The
sellers of good cars will not want to sell their cars at this price and begin
leaving the market. The equilibrium price will fall as lemons make up a
greater share of the used car market. More and more sellers leave as the
Singer, "Advertising: A Sociocultural Force", supra note 43 at 124.
Supra note 37 at 119. A Pareto optimal exchange is one in which at least one paiiy is
made better off while at the same time no party to the exchange is made worse off.
54
StijJra note 37 at 119.
55
For an outline see E. Mansfield, 1vl'icraeco11omics, 7'h ed. (New York: W.W. Norton,
1991) at 44-45.
52

53
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equilibrium price falls below the value of their car. Eventually only the
worst of the lemons are left in the market and the market collapses.
The solution to the market for lemons problem is to eliminate the
asymmetry of information. Sellers of good cars must convey to buyers
the info1mation they possess - that their cars are not lemons. Sellers of
good cars will thus try to signal to buyers that their cars are of good
quality. However, the sellers of lemons have an economic incentive to
send the same signals. Advertising would, at first blush, seem to be the
perfect solution to this problem. By advertising objective information
about their products, sellers of products are able to solve the asymmetric
information problem. However, as we have seen, most advertisements
don't convey objective information. Sellers of inferior products have no
incentive to convey to consumers the true inf01mation about their
product. They wish to maintain a certain amount of asymmetric
information.
This hypothesis supports the finding by Jhally that most
adve1iisements contain unsubstantiated subjective claims. 56 These types
of claims are not deceptive in the strict legal sense, yet can send (false)
signals of superiority to consumers. Whom are consumers to believe, the
advertiser who claims that a brand of detergent is clinically proven to
remove stains more effectively than its competitors, or the advertiser
who claims that a brand of detergent "gets clothes their whitest"?
In terms of the law of commercial expression, what this means is
that individual consumers have a vested interest in obtaining objective
info1mation. This was recognized by the Supreme Court and used as a
rationale for granting constitutional protection to commercial
expression. What was not recognized by the court is that by granting
commercial expression Charter protection it has limited, rather than
enhanced, the public's ability to receive valuable economic infonnation.
It has already been shown that some advertisers do not want to convey
useful, objective information. By granting commercial expression
constitutional protection the Supreme Comi has ensured that they will
not have to. The RJR-MacDonaldruling makes it clear that the right to
free expression includes the right not to say certain things. 57
Governments would find it extremely difficult to force adve1iisers to
56
57

Supra note 22 at 161.
/UR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A. G), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 at para. 124.
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place objective information in their advertisements if those
advertisements are constitutionally protected. Thus, any attempt by the
government to force advertisers to place in their advertisements the very
type of infonnation that was the reason for granting advertisements
constitutional protection in the first place would be deemed a violation
of the advertisers' s. 2(b) rights. 58 The government would thus be
commercial
required to justify under section 1 of the
expression legislation that promotes greater economic efficiency, even
though greater economic efficiency was one of the reasons the Supreme
Court gave commercial expression constitutional protection in the first
place. In practical terms the Supreme Court has acted to impede the very
goals it is attempting to advance. The irony of this situation cannot be
overstated.
iii Commercial Erpression in the Marketplace qfIdeas
There is one final aspect of commercial expression that needs to be
considered. The Supreme Court's rationale that commercial expression
promotes informed economic decisions is debunked by an analysis of
the content and the costs of advertising. It is also challenged by an
analysis of media control.
The Supreme Court's justification for granting commercial
expression constitutional protection on the grounds that it promotes
informed economic choice suggests that commercial expression
provides consumers with objective information, not just about one
particular product or service, but about all available products or services.
A necessary ingredient of info1med economic choice is, naturally,
choice. Once again, the theo1y is sound, but the practice is not. An
analysis of commercial expression data reveals that commercial
expression as it actually exists does not promote informed economic
choice. We have seen already that the info1med aspect is sorely missing.
The evidence suggests that choice is not far behind.
Two factors play a part in the inability of commercial expression to
promote informed economic choice. The first is the oligopolistic control
Hutchinson, "Money Talk" supra note 6 at 18.
Section I of the Charter reads: "l. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
58
59
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of the media. The second is the prohibitive costs associated with
advertising.
As J. Hannigan notes, "[t]hroughout the present century, there has
been a steady trend toward increasing concentration of media control in
the hands of a decreasing pool of owners." 60 The statistics ce1iainly
support this conclusion. In 1998 five Canadian newspaper companies
controlled ninety-three percent of the daily newspaper circulation in
Canada. 61 In 1997 four cable operator companies accounted for 77.4
percent of the total number of cable subscribers in Canada. 62 Radio fares
somewhat better, with six broadcasting groups representing 35.8 percent
of total listening hours in 1996. 63
This level of concentration in the media industry casts serious
doubts on the ability of commercial expression to be free. There is little
doubt that these media organizations will not freely allow speech, even
commercial speech, to flow through their pmiicular media unless it
serves their ends. The constitutional recognition of commercial
expression has limited one of the state's abilities to deal with the
concentration of media ownership. This problem of concentration can be
remedied by regulating the media or regulating the messages. The
constitutional protection of commercial expression has drastically
reduced the state's ability to regulate the messages. Any attempt to
cmiail the commercial speech of those able to use the media in favour of
those who are not able to do so would be a violation of the advertisers'
section 2(b) rights.
Even more problematic than the concentration of media ownership
is the prohibitive costs of adve1iising, especially on television. In the
U.S. in 1994, the cost of a 30 second commercial spot on American

60
J. Hannigan. "Canadian Media Ownership and Control in an Age of Global Megamedia
Empires" in B. Singer, ed. Comm1111ica1ions li1 Canadian
41h ed. (Scarborough:
Nelson, 1995) 311at319.
61
Media Awareness Network, "Media Industries: Media Ownership" (Source: Canadian
Newspaper Association), online: http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/issues/stats/
indown.htm
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Media Awareness Network, "Media Industries: Television" (Source: MediaStats),
online: http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/ issues/stats/indtv .htm
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Media Awareness Network, "Media Industries: Radio" (Source: Canadian Association of
Broadcasters), online: http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/issues/stats/indrad.htm
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television ranged from (U.S.) $130,000 to $270,000. 64 Furthermore,
combined advertising expenditures in the U.S. in 1997 exceeded (U.S.)
$1 85 billion. In Canada it was estimated at $10 billion to $15 billion. 65
Comanor and Wilson argued that advertising can be used as a force
for market concentration, as established corporations will use massive
advertising expenditures as a baITier to entry. 66 Advertising can thus be
used by large corporations to keep new entrants out of their markets, or
to drive out smaller competitors. The constitutional protection of free
expression enhances their ability to do this. The Supreme Court, in
opening up the "marketplace of ideas" to commercial expression, has, in
so doing (to follow the metaphor) created a massive market failure. The
presence of commercial expression in the marketplace of ideas means
that very few people will be able to afford to get their message out. This
monopolization of the market by the wealthy corporate interests cannot
enhance informed economic decisions. Consumers will become all too
well aware of certain economic players, and remain virtually ignorant of
others.

In Ford and Irwin Toy the Supreme Comi of Canada made it clear
that commercial expression is protected by the Charter. This paper has
attempted to demonstrate why this was an incoITect decision on the pari
of the Comi. Rather than challenge the liberal and economic rationales
of the Court by using competing schools of legal thought, the Supreme
Court's decision can be challenged from within that very same legal and
economic framework.
The Supreme Court set forth several justifications for granting
commercial expression Charter protection. When these justifications
are properly analyzed, they lead to the conclusion that commercial
<A Media Awareness Network, "Media Issues: Advertising and Commercialism" (Source:
Nielsen Media Research, January 1997), online: http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/issues/
stats/issad.htm
65 Media Awareness Network, "Media Issues: Advertising and Commercialism" (Source:
The Ottawa Citizen, January 1998), online: http://www.media-awareness.ca/eng/issues/stats/
issad.htrn
66
Cornanor and Wilson, supra note 44.
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expression does not deserve constitutional protection. Commercial
expression is not expression in the constitutional sense - it serves none
of the values which underlie the granting of constitutional protection to
free expression. Commercial expression does not serve to aid in the
quest for individual self-fulfilment or autonomy. Commercial
expression does not serve to enhance or preserve our democratic system
it may in fact hinder it. Furthermore, commercial expression does not
deserve protection on economic grounds because it does not assist
individuals in making informed economic decisions.
Advertising does not serve rational, informed choice and therefore
does not serve to improve individual autonomy or self-fulfilment. It
blocks rational consideration, not by banning it but by completely
displacing it. Moreover, the traditional liberal solution of "more speech"
is not feasible because there is nothing to "speak" against. Because
advertising "does not involve the articulation of ideas and feelings for
the reflection of an audience, there is no way of joining debate with it, of
refuting its claims". 67 Whatever uses commercial expression may serve,
it does not serve the underlying values of personal fulfilment and
autonomy which support the constitutional protection of free
expression.
Commercial expression does not serve to preserve or improve our
democratic system. Commercial expression threatens informed choice
and works to reduce or displace rational discourse. It can lead viewers to
falsely believe as true the assumptions that underlie commercial
expression. This can only hinder the democratic process.
Finally, the economic rationales that commercial expression
protects buyers and assists individuals in making informed economic
decisions are also refuted upon closer analysis. Neither of these
rationales support the constitutional protection of commercial
expression because commercial expression does not for the most pa1i
serve either of these interests. While it is true that commercial
expression can serve these interests, the evidence demonstrates that in a
majority of cases it does not.
There is, of course, the counter-argument that while commercial
expression may not at all times fulfill the justifications put foiih by the
Supreme Court, it surely does in some instances, and is therefore worthy
67
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of constitutional protection. This argument is not convincing. When
dealing with something as important as Charter rights, the onus on the
Supreme Court must be to provide justifications that apply in the
majority, not minority of the cases. The Court has not done so with the
justifications for protecting commercial speech. While the theory is
sound, the reality is not.
The purpose of this paper has not been to suggest that commercial
expression in absolute terms should not be granted constitutional
protection. Rather, it has been to demonstrate that the reasons put
forward by the Supreme Court do not support their decision to expand
the scope of the constitutional meaning of expression to include
commercial expression. There very well may be compelling arguments
in favour of protecting commercial expression, but the arguments thus
far relied on are not them. If the Supreme Court is not going to reverse its
stand on commercial expression (and it is nai've to think that it will), it
would do well to reconsider its reasons for granting constitutional
protection to commercial expression. Those who favour free
commercial expression, those who oppose it and indeed even the
Charter itself deserve no less.

